

*In theory and practice ..*

## **Michael Grubb**

Prof. International Energy and Climate Change Policy, UCL


Chair, UK government Panel of Technical Experts on Energy Market Reform

Editor-in-Chief, *Climate Policy* journal

**Australia National University**

**6 December 2016**

- Broadening our economic frameworks
- Emerging transition in practice
- Innovation and cost reductions
- Integrating policies
- Some international implications



Energy policy needs to address:

- **Security**
  - *System resilience, over-concentration, geopolitical risk*
- **Affordability & competitiveness**
  - *Fuel poverty, the disconnected, 'industrial energy prices'*
- **Environment and sustainability**
  - *Air quality, climate change, mining and water*


Prioritising one too much over the others generates instability  
Focus here particularly on electricity, increasingly important in other sectors (transport, buildings)




A *systems* issue ..

- For a problem which spans from
- the inattentive decision-making of seven billion energy consumers, to
  - long-term transformation of vast and complex infrastructure-based techno-economic systems

To date, far more progress on energy efficiency and technology / renewables etc policy than carbon pricing



Ideal policy comprises a package which matches the best instrument to the respective domain of decision-making



In the long run, *countries with higher energy prices do not spend more of their income on energy*

- Higher efficiency and innovation policies compensate
- *Indeed countries that subsidised energy to keep it cheap have ended up spending more*




Figure 6-1 The most important diagram in energy economics

Note: The graph plots average energy intensity against average energy prices (1990-2005) for a range of prices. The dotted line shows the line of constant energy expenditure (intensity x price) per unit GDP over the period. Source: After Newbery (2003), with updated data from International Energy Agency and EU KLEMS



## The “Bashmakov-Newbery Constant”

- The proportion of national income spent on energy has remained surprisingly constant, *given sufficient time to adjust*
  - for more than a century
  - for most countries
- *Despite* huge variations in energy prices (Bashmakov)
- Cannot be explained through the classical measures of in-country consumer price response (elasticities) but needs also to invoke:
  - **Energy efficiency** regulation and related policy responses
  - **Innovation** throughout energy supply and product chains

Challenge is to accelerate efficiency & decarb-innovation for several decades *without politically untenable policy-driven price shocks*

- **From carbon prices, or eg. renewables support costs**



## The Three Domains link to wider debates about macroeconomic growth

- Economic research points to two key areas of economic growth in addition to resource accumulation:
  - Improving efficiency of many economic actors and structures
  - Education, infrastructure and innovation
- *ie.* First and Third domain processes are recognised as important for macroeconomic growth. Yet these remain
  - largely absent in global (or national) modelling
  - poorly charted in policy
- Energy is a particularly strong candidate because
  - Multiple product characteristics => structural inefficiencies
  - Historic instability of fossil fuel markets
  - Exceptionally low rates of innovation particularly electricity & construction
  - Pervasive input to numerous production sectors



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
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
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## Need to steer not marginal+ but structural and systemic change




*“No wind is favourable to those who don't know where they are going”*


- Lucius Annaeus Seneca



# In UK – once an ‘island of coal in a sea of oil and gas’ - orientation set by Climate Change Act, with statutory 80%-below-1990 mid-Century




# Reductions to the mid 2000s largely comprised reductions in industry, power (1990s “dash-for-gas”) and waste – mostly driven by other trends & policies



Source: DECC (2016) *Provisional GHG statistics for 2015*; DECC (2016) *Final GHG statistics for 1990-2014*; CCC analysis.

- **Labelling and standards** (mostly driven from EU): effective in appliances, significant in buildings but implementation challenges major improvements in vehicles



- **Supplier obligations** (“white certificates”) delivered 1-2% reductions in electricity & gas demand, 2008-13, from domestics – pressure to switch focus from ‘cheap’ to ‘deep’ to ‘vulnerable’
- Substantial impact (but also much controversy) over ‘**CRC**’ **buy-and-trade** for less energy intensive business (retail, etc)
- Much-hyped ‘**Green Deal**’ – loans for energy efficiency tied to properties – an unmitigated embarrassment

## Electricity supplied by major UK generators by fuel, 1990-2014





Figure 1 The dash for gas the decline of coal, a competitive market & Elec Market Reform

Source (data): Digest of UK Energy Statistics, various years





## UK approach: four pillars of *Energy Market Reform*




Major changes to UK electricity market, implemented during 2011-15





## Contracts for Difference (CfDs)

(structure for renewable energy & nuclear)



- Energy price topped up (or reimbursed) to a “**strike price**”
- **Initial contracts** awarded by government; moving to
- **Competitive auction** held by National Grid, sophisticated design

## *... when combined with competitive auctions*

- Administered prices, May 2014 followed by competitive auction, Jan 2015
- Over £315m/yr new contracts offered to five renewable technology classes
- Over 2GW of new capacity with saving £110m/yr cf administered price in 2014
- Estimate cost of capital reduction by 3 percentage points – saving £bns.


|                                  | Capacity | Admin Strike price 2014 (£/MWh) | Lowest auction clearing price Jan 2015 | Maximum % saving |
|----------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|--|------------------|
| Solar PV                         | 72       | 120                             | <b>79</b>                              | <b>34%</b>       |
| Onshore Wind                     | 1162     | 95                              | <b>79</b>                              | <b>17%</b>       |
| Energy from Waste CHP            | 95       | 80                              | <b>80</b>                              | <b>0%</b>        |
| Offshore Wind                    | 750      | 140                             | <b>114</b>                             | <b>18%</b>       |
| Advanced Conversion Technologies | 62       | 140                             | <b>114</b>                             | <b>18%</b>       |

- Other European auctions in 2016 with further cost reductions
- Next UK auction announced, expected even offshore wind << £100/MWh
- Now well within the 'BNC' range of affordability, *if & as system evolves*






Dramatic (80%) fall since 2012: first hours without coal power for over a Century  
Driven as declining gas price meets rising carbon price, and renewables  
Falls 2012-15 offset by rising renewables; increased gas in 2016






## 10% fall in EU coal generation in 2016

- German renewables + gas
- Netherlands coal plant retirements
- Spain & Portugal return to normal
- UK €30/t carbon price (+renewables)



# Target consistent carbon values

Figure B3.7: Target-consistent carbon values and market prices (2015-2050)



- Scenarios include measures available at lower cost than Government carbon values
- And reflect need to ensure that measures required to meet 2050 target are available to be deployed when needed

# Delivering the Energy Transition

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
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# We are seeking radical innovation *in some of the least innovative sectors of our economies*




Fig.9.7

R&D expenditure by top companies in different sectors as per cent of sales, 2011




Fig.9.3 R&D expenditure by top companies in different sectors as % of sales, 2011

The 'technology valley of death' caused by  
 high up-front innovation costs & long lead times => large risks  
 weak demand-pull and large market risks in innovating for policy-dependent value



Mix of strategic investments in both technology push and demand pull needed to overcome numerous obstacles



# Driven mainly by public policy, big reductions in PV and battery costs

PV: New record installed power prices  
 Chile = \$30/MWh  
 Masdar = \$25/MWh  
 Abu Dhabi = \$24/MWh  
 Module costs: -29% in 2016 to \$0.39/Watt


Cost for lithium-ion battery packs



<http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-ev-oil-crisis/>

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-27/elon-musk-says-it-s-pencils-down-for-tesla-s-model-3>

# Prices trends of the big renewables, sharp declines – *but also show the centrality of policy risk*



Recent trends in international costs and contracted prices for wind and solar (source: UCL Submission)






## Distributed Service Providers

Combined with

## Big generation developments, such as Dogger Bank



TenneT CEO Mel Kroon commented: "In Germany and more recently in the Netherlands, TenneT has the role of developer and operator of the offshore grid. From this responsibility we have taken the initiative to establish a realistic and achievable plan for further development of the North Sea. The success of the energy transition depends largely on the extent to which we mount a coordinated joint effort in Europe. Cooperation between national governments, regulators, the offshore wind industry, national grid administrators and nature and environmental organisations is a precondition for achieving Europe's environmental targets. The vision we have presented shows the relevance of cooperation in the North Sea."


### North Sea Infrastructure: the vision

Solar and wind energy will be necessary on a large scale because attainment of Europe's targets for reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions depends largely on the production of renewable electricity. Moreover, wind and solar energy are



# Transition needs to extend into other sectors and more integrated systems

Figure 3.12: Emissions reductions in the Central Scenario and to 2050



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
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


Need to integrate across all three pillars:

- Enhanced efficiency
- Cleaner products
- Innovation and infrastructure

And harness this for *social and industrial strategy*

- Lower resource costs
- Consider carbon pricing including *materials consumption & low-C materials*
- Accelerate innovation for competitiveness



## Must change!

- Not an abstract (externality pricing) but an *instrumental* rationale
  - Investment as well as operational incentive
  - A source of funding for energy efficiency and innovation programmes
  - A political narrative based around stability of energy expenditure
- Key design elements for market carbon pricing
  - A price corridor on emissions trading
  - Linked with technology strategy
  - Energy-intensive industry, carbon leakage concerns potentially addressed through trade linkages and/or carbon pricing on material consumption
  - 'carbon leakage' increasingly offset by 'clean technology diffusion'
- More tools in the toolbox, including carbon-backed contracts, reference and internal carbon pricing

*With a basis in international strategy / coalition implementation of PA*

- A coalition of countries strengthening their NDC commitment in 2020?
- Coordination of price, technology investment and trade approaches?



A **rising base** carbon reduction value *could* contribute *across* Domains:

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <b>1. Attention effects and funding</b>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• rising steadily enables efficiency to keep pace and stop much rise in total bills</li><li>• efficiency programmes may counter regressive concerns?</li></ul>                          |
| <b>2. Rising price differential</b>         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• steadily reduce use of coal in power generation without huge asset stranding</li><li>• help to move renewables over time from transitional subsidies into mainstream market</li></ul> |
| <b>3. Long term visibility and leverage</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• increased investment stability</li><li>• time and leveraged funding for innovation, infrastructure and tech transfer programmes</li></ul>   |

.. To help drive the *risk transition* from clean on to dirty fuels



## Some conclusions

- 21<sup>st</sup> Century energy systems will be radically different from 20<sup>th</sup> Century
- Understanding transition on this scale means broadening economic horizons to all three domains and associated pillars of policy
- Transition is already under way, so far driven far more by the non-pure-market policies
- Aggregate cost impacts (eg. Germany) pushed to the limit of this approach, but resulting technology cost reductions place the transition within reach of global development and more balanced policy packages
- Clear policy direction can shift risk and lower finance costs
- ... including new roles and narrative for carbon pricing



# Planetary Economics:

## Energy, Climate Change and the Three Domains of Sustainable Development



1. Introduction: Trapped?
2. The Three Domains

### Pillar 1

- **Standards and engagement *for* smarter choice**
- 3: Energy and Emissions – Technologies and Systems
- 4: Why so wasteful?
- 5: Tried and Tested – Four Decades of Energy Efficiency Policy


### Pillar II

- **Markets and pricing *for* cleaner products and processes**
- 6: Pricing Pollution – of Truth and Taxes
- 7: Cap-and-trade & offsets: from idea to practice
- 8: Who's hit? Handling the distributional impacts of carbon pricing

### Pillar III

- **Investment and incentives for innovation and infrastructure**
- 9: Pushing further, pulling deeper
- 10: Transforming systems
- 11: The dark matter of economic growth

12. Conclusions: Changing Course



Published Routledge 2014

6-page 'Highlights' paper available

<http://climatestrategies.org/projects/planetary-economics/>

for further information #planetaryeconomics