JOKOWI’S FIRST YEAR: A WEAK PRESIDENT CAUGHT BETWEEN OLIGARCHIC POLITICS AND REFORM

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Structure of Presentation

• The Puzzle: High Hopes, Disappointing Outcomes
• Framework: Oligarchy versus Cartelization Theories
• Challenges: Triple Minority Position; Pressures from Party Oligarchs; Declining Public Support
• Personal Characteristics: Jokowi as a Political Leader
• Responses: Adjusting the Ruling Formula
• Conclusion
Tidal Wave of Expectations

- From outside the Jakarta power structure
- No military background or ties with influential families.
- Seen as a “product” of *reformasi*.
- Supported by a vast network of volunteers and NGOs activists.
The Promise: Reforms

• “A breath of fresh air” in Indonesian politics.
• Jokowi’s win over Prabowo widely seen as democracy’s victory.
• Promised to bring a new style of politics to Indonesia.
The Record: Realpolitik over Reform

• Failed his first test when he selected his cabinet.
• Jokowi’s response to the controversy surrounding the Budi Gunawan case
• Failed to defend the KPK from criminalization.
The Puzzle

Why did Jokowi fail to deliver on his bold promises of reform during his first year in office?

What has gone wrong for Jokowi in whom so much hope was invested?
Oligarchy and Cartelisation Theories

- The **oligarchy** school:
  1. Power concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy individuals;
  2. Wealth as a means of political influence; and
  3. In turn, power provides greater wealth.

- The **cartelization** school:
  1. Party ideology unimportant in determining coalitions;
  2. Political competition only occurs at election time;
  3. Promiscuous government coalitions; and
  4. No significant opposition in parliament.
The Death of the Ruling Cartel?

• Grounds for optimism that Jokowi would take a progressive turn, contradicting cartelization theory:
  • First, a limited coalition.
  • Second, a coalition with no strings attached.
  • Third, promised to reduce the number of ministries.
  • Fourth, the 2014 election produced a sharper line between government and opposition parties.
  • Fifth, Jokowi named his cabinet the ‘Working Cabinet’.
Jokowi’s Triple Minority Position

• First, a minority coalition.
• Second, marginal figure in his own party.
• Third, a newcomer to the national stage.
• With so little political capital in hand, Jokowi had to keep a good rapport with his party oligarchs.
Cost of Compromises (1)
The Cabinet Formation

• A slim coalition, but full of compromises with his backers.

• Megawati had a huge influence, along with Surya Paloh and Jusuf Kalla

• 15 ministers from political parties, 7 ex-military or technocrats promoted by party oligarchs.
Political Support for Indonesian Cabinets from Megawati to Jokowi

Megawati 2001-2004

Govt, 82
Non-Govt, 18

SBY 2004-2009

Govt, 73
Non-Govt, 27

SBY 2009-2014

Govt, 75
Non-Govt, 25

Jokowi 2014-2019

Govt, 37
Non-Govt, 63
Double Loss for Jokowi

- First, he missed the opportunity to establish a “minimal winning coalition”.
- Second, a high price for a minority coalition.
- More dependent on Megawati, Kalla, Paloh.
- Oligarchic style concessions to Surya Paloh.
Cost of Compromises (2): The Budi Gunawan Affair

- Jokowi appointed Megawati’s former adjutant Budi Gunawan as police chief.
- KPK named Budi a suspect.
- Surya and Kalla pushed Jokowi to inaugurate Budi.
- But Jokowi cancelled Budi’s nomination.
- Paralysed by the entrenched oligarchs, but Jokowi is not completely tamed.
KPK and the Police

- The Budi case escalated tensions between KPK and the police.
- Police named KPK chairman a suspect and arrested another commissioner.
- Jokowi’s reluctance to stop the criminalization of KPK.
Jokowi as Political Leader

- **Personal Preference:** Greater emphasis on the economy than democratic reform.
- Other sectors seen as secondary to the economy.
- Example: circular letter to protect regional heads; Budi Waseso’s dismissal.
- Intra-oligarchic conflict within the ruling oligarchy.
Policy Record

• Technocratic-Populism.
  (1) Investment deregulation;
  (2) Fuel subsidy reductions;
  (3) Pushing for infrastructure; and
  (4) Social welfare programs.
“The idea that the world’s economic problems can be solved only through the World Bank, IMF and ADB is obsolete and must be abandoned. I am of the opinion that the fate of the global economy should not only be left to those three financial institutions” (Asia-Africa Summit)
An Amateur Hour?

Joko: ‘I Don’t Read What I Sign’
Losing support from the public, including some of his supporter base that brought him to power.
Jokowi’s public approval rating to be worse than that of former President Yudhoyono in the first year of his two-term presidency.
Indonesia’s Economic Condition (%)
July 2014 – June 2015

[Graph showing economic condition changes from July 2014 to June 2015 with different categories: Don't know, Much worse, Much better, No change.]
Despite a majority of voters disapproved Jokowi’s performance, 68% of voters surveyed believe that Jokowi should not be removed from office before the 2019 election.
Adjusting the Ruling Formula

• Jokowi has begun to balance ruling and opposition parties.
• Prabowo seemed to readjust his strategy
• Prabowo realize that the public is generally not in favor of a radical opposition.
• Prabowo can only control Gerindra & PKS.
• Speculation that a “short-term deal” reached between Jokowi, Prabowo & Bakrie.
Complex Power Struggle
More “Javanese” Approach to Megawati

- Non-oligarchic style concessions to Megawati.
- Deepening smooth relationship with Megawati through cultural approach.
Recent Consolidation of Power Base

- A classic carrot and stick strategy resulted in the weakening of opposition.
- The inclusion of PAN into the government to counterbalance party oligarchs.
- Signs for Indonesia drifting back toward party cartels?
- Jokowi began to revive public trust in him.

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<th>Peta Koalisi Politik Nasional Berubah</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koalisi Indonesia Hebat</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
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<tr>
<td>109 kursi (19,5%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
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<tr>
<td>47 kursi (8,4%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nasdem</td>
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<td>36 kursi (6,4%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 kursi (2,9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
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<td>48 kursi (8,6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koalisi Merah Putih</td>
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<tr>
<td>Golkar*</td>
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<td>91 kursi (16,3%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
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<tr>
<td>73 kursi (13,0%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>40 kursi (7,1%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP*</td>
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<tr>
<td>39 kursi (7,0%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partai Penyeimbang</td>
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<td>Demokrat</td>
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<td>61 kursi (10,8%)</td>
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Keterangan: Sebelumnya PAN berada di KMP, *Golkar dan PPP mengalami dualisme kepengurusan
Sumber: Litbang “Kompas”/YOH

INFOGRAFIK: ANDRI
Conclusion

• Jokowi failed to deliver on his bold promises of reform during his first year in office largely because of personal and external factors.

• First, Jokowi personally lacks leadership on anti-corruption and human right issues.

• Second, structural factors are also important: (1) Jokowi successfully ended the massive party cartel, but this made him vulnerable; and (2) It is virtually impossible to overturn oligarchic influences in Indonesian politics.

• After recent consolidation of his power base, Jokowi has begun to devise strategies to regain broad popular appeal.
THANK YOU